cultivar_22_Final_EN

Technology and Unemployment: We Have Been Here Before 41 not strictly governed by eco- nomic factors. What explains the decoupling of wages from productivity from the late 1970s? Among other things, the weakening of these very devices in the name of flexibility, also politically determined. As we near the hundredth anniversary of Keynes’ arti- cle, and therefore the end of his forecasting horizon, we can see that Keynes was mistaken. How? Accord- ing to Robert (and Edward) Skidelsky 24 – an authority on Keynes’ work – his forecasts of growth were not wrong, but his predictions about shorter working hours were. Working hours did fall on average in the developed capitalist countries, but if cur- rent trends continue, we will be working an average of 35 hours in 2030 and not 15 as Keynes predicted. Skidelsky’s explanation for Keynes’ forecasting error lies at the intersection between the following three points: the pleasure of work and fear of inactivity, necessity and insatiability. As they explain, “Keynes’s mistake was to believe that the love of gain released by capitalism could be sated with abundance, leaving people free to enjoy its fruits in civilised life … [he] did not understand that cap- italism would set up a new dynamic of want creation…” 25 24 Skidelsky, Robert and Skidelsky, Edward (2013), How Much is Enough? – Money and the Good Life , London: Penguin Books. 25 Ibid ., p. 41-42. 26 Carvalho da Silva; Manuel, Hespanha, Pedro; Teles, Nuno and Caldas, José Castro (2017), “Introdução” in Carvalho da Silva; Manuel, Hes- panha, Pedro e Caldas, José Castro (Coords.) (2017), Trabalho e Políticas de Emprego – um Retrocesso Evitável , Lisbon: Actual, pp. 16–33. In conclusion We do not know if we are experiencing a technological wave comparable in effect to those of the past. “Robots might be everywhere,” as the media report, “but they take time to appear in the statistics.” 26 In fact, economic data for the world’s most technologically advanced country – the USA – show a drop in productivity growth between 1995 and 2014. However, the public realm is saturated with announcements of the arrival of battalions of smart robots ready to produce lots of things very cheaply and push humans into the ranks of the industrial reserve army. We have examined past con- troversies in the aim of con- tributing to improving the quality of the debate on the consequences of new technologies for employ- ment and labour. The first thought that springs to mind, but as no more than an inter- esting fact, is that the talk of the end of work that fills the media being derived from past theories applies much more to Marx than to econo- mists who are unconditional apologists for technological progress and are behind most media-driven econom- ics commentary. Secondly, the “compen- sation” of employment destroyed by mechanisation depends on institu- tions able to align labour productivity growth with wages and not free market mechanisms. … three points: the pleasure of work and fear of inactivity, necessity and insatiability. We do not know if we are experiencing a technological wave comparable in effect to those of the past. “Robots might be everywhere,” as the media report, “but they take time to appear in the statistics.” … the “compensation” of employment destroyed by mechanisation depends on institutions able to align labour productivity growth with wages and not free market mechanisms. … technology in itself is not the decisive game changer that we thought. Its impacts depend on the institutional context in which innovation takes place.